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CONTINGENT PERCENTAGE FEES: AN
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
MICHAEL A. DOVER
C ONTINGENT PERCENTAGE FEES' represent the
primary means of financing personal injury litigation
in the United States.2 Under a contingent percentage fee
contract, a client pays his attorney a specified percentage
of any recovery obtained. 3  However, the attorney re-
ceives no compensation if the litigation proves
unsuccessful.4
After discussing the development of contingent per-
centage fees in personal injury litigation,5  this comment
examines the arguments supporting 6 and opposing7 con-
, Contingent percentage fees are defined as:
[A]n arrangement between attorney and client whereby attorney
agrees to represent client with compensation to be a percentage of
the amount recovered; e.g. 25% if case is settled, 30% if case goes to
trial. Frequently used in personal injury actions. Such fees are often
regulated by court rule or statute depending upon the type of action
and amount of recovery.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 553 (5th ed. 1979). The essential distinction between a
contingent fee and a certain fee is that payment of a contingent fee is conditioned
upon the success of the litigation; i.e. if there is no recovery then the attorney
receives no fee. F. MACKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES 3 (1964).
Contingent percentage fees are frequently referred to as "contingent fees," how-
ever, this comment will use the term "contingent percentage fee" to distinguish
this fee from other contingent fees, such as a contingent hourly fee.
2 Clermont & Currivan, Improving on the Contingent Fee, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 529,
531 n.2 (1978). See also F. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 116; Franklin, Chanin &
Mark, Accidents, Money, and the Law: A Study of the Economics of Personal Injury Litiga-
tion, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 22 (1961).
• F. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 3.
4Id.
See infra notes 10-58 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 59-119 and accompanying text.
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tingent percentage fees. Following this examination, sev-
eral proposed alternatives to contingent percentage fees
are critically analyzed. 8 Finally, this comment concludes
that the current percentage fee system is acceptable, how-
ever, steps should be taken to ensure that potential clients
have sufficient information to make an informed decision
concerning the choice of an attorney.9
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONTINGENT
PERCENTAGE FEES
A. English Practice'0
Although contingent percentage fees are frequently
employed to finance personal injury litigation in the
United States, other countries have not embraced contin-
gent percentage fees. For example, contingent percent-
age fees are permitted in neither Great Britain," nor the
English Commonwealth nations.' 2 However, in Canada,
contingent percentage fees are permitted in all provinces
except Ontario. t' Moreover, West Germany' 4  and
Spain 15 are the only civil law countries which permit con-
See infra notes 123-160 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 161-251 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 252-262 and accompanying text.
10 The English legal system strongly influenced the American legal system. A
discussion of the English treatment of percentage fees is necesssary for a
thorough understanding of American practice. See Minish, The Contingent Fee a Re-
examinae, 10 MANITOBA. L.J. 65, 67 (1979).
11 Id. at 68. See also Thomas, Contingent Fees: A Case Study for Malaysia, 10 ANGLO-
AM. L. REV. 37, 43-52 (1981); Comment, Judicial Regulation of Contingent Fee Con-
tracts, 48J. AIR L. & CoM. 151, 153 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Contin-
gent Fee Contracts]; Comment, Are Contingent Fees Ethical Where Client Is Able to Pay a
Retainer, 20 OHIO ST. L.J. 329, 334-36 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Are
Contingent Fees Ethical].
"2 See Note, The Contingent Fee. Disciplinary Rule, Ethical Consideration, or Free Com-
petition?, 1979 UTAH L. REV. 547, 555 n.47.
13 Kritzer, Fee Arrangements and Fee Shifting. Lessons From the Experience in Ontario,
47 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 130 (1984). One distinction between contingent
percentage fee contracts in the United States and those in Canada is that Cana-
dian courts may review contingent fee arrangements. Id. at 130 n.22.
,4White, Contingent Fees: A Supplement to Legal Aid? 41 MOD. L. REv. 286, 290-91
(1978).
I. Comment, Are Contingent Fees Ethical, supra note 11, at 336.
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tingent percentage fees.
The long-standing English prohibition of contingent
percentage fees results from the medieval doctrines of
maintenance, 16 champerty, 17 and barratry. 8  Contingent
percentate fees violate the doctrines of maintenance and
champerty because the attorney is "maintaining" the cli-
ent until an award is received, 19 and the attorney is con-
tracting to receive a share of the proceeds of the
litigation.2 ° In addition, the English have traditionally
viewed litigation as undesirable.2 ' Thus, English opposi-
tion to contingent percentage fees probably results from
their desire to discourage litigation.
Another reason contingent percentage fees have not
been accepted in Great Britain is the widespread availabil-
ity of publicly financed legal aid.22 Legal aid provides im-
,, Maintenance is defined as "maintaining, supporting, or promoting the litiga-
tion of another." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 859 (5th ed. 1979). The doctrine of
maintenance arose during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries as a means to
remedy abuses in the feudal system. F. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 36. See also
Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24 CALIF. L. REV. 48, 64 (1935). Maintenance was
prohibited by the Statute of Westminster I in 1275. 3 Edw. I, ch. 25, at 53. This
statute sought to prevent powerful feudal lords from injecting themselves into
controversies to which they were not parties. F. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 36.
The prohibition of maintenance was not originally directed at lawyers, but was
intended as a means of reestablishing royal control over the nobility. Id. at 36-37.
17 Champerty is defined as "[a) bargain by a stranger with a party to a suit, by
which such third person undertakes to carry on the litigation at his own cost and
risk, in consideration of receiving, if successful, a part of the proceeds or subject
to be covered." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 209 (5th ed. 1979).
18 Barratry is the solicitation by non-parties, of persons to engage in litigation.
F. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 37.
19 Minish, supra note 10, at 68.
20 Id.
21 Radin, supra note 16, at 66. Radin states that clerical opposition to litigation,
particularly secular litigation, together with the feudal system and resistance to
capitalism formed the background for the development of the doctrines of main-
tenance and champerty. Id. at 65-66.
22 Corboy, Contingency Fees: The Individual's Key to the Courthouse Door, LITIGATION,
Summer 1976, at 27, 32. The English legal aid system pays the legal fees of both
parties in an estimated fifty percent of all serious cases. Id. "The system compen-
sates attorneys at government expense, to the extent of 90 percent of their non-
assisted fees for office consultation and litigation in cases in which the party being
represented is indigent in the sense that financing a lawsuit would be burden-
some." Id. A legal aid committee examines the claimant's financial situation and
the merits of the complaint in an attempt to eliminate frivolous lawsuits. Id
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poverished plaintiffs with an opportunity to obtain legal
representation. 23 Contingent percentage fees serve a sim-
ilar function in the United States and Canada, by allowing
plaintiffs to shift the risk of loss to their attorney24 and by
allowing the plaintiff to pay his attorney from the pro-
ceeds of any recovery. 5 For example, in Manitoba, Legal
Aid will not handle personal injury cases if representation
is available on a contingent percentage fee basis. 26 Simi-
larly, in the United States most local legal assistance pro-
grams refuse to handle cases for which representation
could be obtained on a contingent percentage basis.27
Thus, the availability of legal aid in Great Britain allows
the British bar to continue to prohibit contingent percent-
age fees without having to face the possibility of impover-
ished plaintiffs being unable to obtain legal
representation.2
B. Contingent Percentage Fees in the United States
American legal practice has been strongly influenced by
English legal traditions,2 9 so it is not surprising that sev-
eral American states initially prohibited contingent per-
centage fees. 3 0  However, a number of states, including
' Id. But see White, supra note 14, at 287 (the income limits for legal aid are so
low that many individuals with moderate incomes are prohibited from bringing
suit in the absence of insurance or trade union support). See also Thomas, supra
note 11, at 51 (the vast majority of British citizens do not benefit from legal aid).
24 See supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
2.1 Minish, supra note 10, at 71. "The contingent fee is the normal and usual
method of compensation for the American lawyer representing a plaintiff in a per-
sonal injury action. . . . In England it is normal and usual for the compensation
arrangements to be made under the Legal Aid Scheme." Youngwood, The Contin-
gent Fee - A Reasonable Alternative?, 28 MOD. L. REV. 330 (1965).
26 Minish, supra note 10, at 71.
27 Id. See also Youngwood, supra note 25, at 335 (legal aid will generally not
accept cases which may be handled by private attorneys on a contingent fee basis).
28 See Youngwood, supra note 25, at 334, See also Corboy, supra note 22, at 32 (a
comprehensive legal aid system is necessary to mitigate the harsh effects resulting
from a ban on contingent percentage fees).
'2' See supra note 10.
.30 See, e.g., Lafferty v.Jelly, 22 Ind. 471, 473-74 (1864) (fifty percent contingent
percentage fee in a collection suit is champertous); Roberts v. Yancey, 94 Ky.
243, 21 S.W. 1047 (1893) (contingent percentage fee contract is champertous and
unforceable in a suit on a note); Hinckley v. Giberson, 129 Me. 308, 151 A. 542,
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Alabama,3 ' California,32  New Jersey,33  Ohio, 4  and
Texas3 5 never prohibited contingent percentage fees. Ad-
ditionally, the United States Supreme Court explicitly ap-
proved contingent percentage fee contracts in Wyle v.
Coxe,36 Taylor v. Bemiss,37 and Stanton v. Embrey.38 The
American Bar Association ("ABA") officially recognized
the validity of contingent percentage fee contracts with
the adoption of Canon 13 of the Code of Professional
Ethics in 1908.$9 Contingent percentage fee contracts are
enforceable in all fifty states,4 ° with Maine the last state to
recognize the validity of such contracts in the mid-
1960s.41 Many members of the American Bar view contin-
gent percentage fees unfavorably, 42 and, at best, contin-
gent percentage fees have received grudging approval as
543 (1930) (one-third contingent percentage fee disallowed in a suit in equity);
Backus v. Byron, 4 Mich. 535 (1857) (a contingent percentage fee was disallowed
in a ejectment proceeding); Butler v. Legro, 62 N.H. 350, 352 (1882) (an agree-
ment which provides that an attorney is to recover $1000 regardless of the
amount of time spent on the case is champertous); Wallis v. Laubat, 2 Denio 607,
607-08 (N.Y. 1845) (a contingent percentage fee disallowed in a suit to compel
specific performance).
3 Exparte Wilkinson, 220 Ala. 529, 126 So. 102, 106 (1930) (an attorney's lien
to collect a contingent fee is enforceable in equity).
12 In re Cohen's Estate, 66 Cal. App.2d 450, 152 P.2d 485, 489 (1944) (Califor-
nia never adopted the common law doctrines of maintenance and champerty).
3 Hughes v. Eisner, 8 N.J. Super. 351, 72 A.2d 901, 902 (1950) (New Jersey
courts rejected the doctrines of maintenance and champerty as early as 1792).
34 Reese v. Kyle, 49 Ohio St. 475, 31 N.E. 747 (1892) (a fifty percent contingent
fee for a suit to collect a debt was held not to be champertous).
35 Bentinck v. Franklin, 38 Tex. 458, 471 (1873) (there is no law forbidding
champerty in Texas, therefore, contingent fees are not prohibited).
- 56 U.S. (15 How.) 415, 418-20 (1853) (plaintiffs attorney permitted to re-
cover a five percent contingent fee).
-7 110 U.S. 42, 46 (1884) (fifty percent contingent fee is not extortionate).
- 93 U.S. 548, 566-67 (1876) (approved contingent percentage fee in a case
involving a claim against the United States).
31 As originally adopted, Canon 13 provided: "Contingent fees where sanc-
tioned by law, should be under the supervision of the court, in order that clients
may be protected from unjust charges." CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, CANON
13, 33 ABA REP. 80, 579 (1908), quoted in DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, A STUDY
OF CONTINGENT FEES IN THE PROSECUTION OF PERSONAL INJURY CLAIMS 7 (1966).
40 DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, supra note 39, at 8.
41 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 516 (1983) (validity of contingent percent-
age fee recognized by excluding contingent fee percentage fee contracts from the
definition of champerty).
42 Youngwood, supra note 25, at 333.
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a "necessary evil." 43
Several reasons have been suggested to explain why
American jurisdictions have declined to follow the English
practice with respect to contingent percentage fees. Per-
haps the most frequently cited rationale for American ac-
ceptance of contingent percentage fees is that the
industrial revolution created a new class of industrial acci-
dent victims who had a need for effective legal representa-
tion.4 4  Without contingent percentage fees, many
industrial laborers would have had insufficient financial
resources to obtain counsel to represent them in their
personal injury actions against large, industrial defend-
ants.45 However, this argument fails to explain the dis-
tinction between American and English practice, since the
industrial revolution presumably created a similar class of
accident victims in both Great Britain and the United
States.46
Another rationale offered to explain the acceptance of
contingent percentage fees in the United States is that liti-
gation is not disfavored in the United States.47 Litigation,
4 Id. Youngwood states:
Despite its widespread use in the United States the contingent fee is,
nevertheless, viewed in many if not most American quarters as a nec-
essary evil. As a general rule it is - if it might be so phrased - the
lower class of lawyers, rather than the acknowledged leaders of the
Bar, whose practice is mainly on a contingent fee basis. It is not
really clear whether the contingent fee in America is looked at with
some disdain by the elite of the profession because of something
inherent in that form of compensation or because the professional
elite look down upon being a plaintiffis tort lawyer, and it is as a
plaintiff's tort lawyer from which most contingent fees arise.
Id. at 333-34.
44 Comment, Contingent Fee Contracts, supra note 11, at 156.
4- Corboy, supra note 22, at 30. "[T]he contingent fee contract developed as a
tool of law practice in direct response to the industrial revolution and the trans-
portation boom, which visited on our working-class ancestors a previously un-
known incidence of industrial injury and death." Id.
40 See Id. at 30-31. Corboy suggests that the American Bar is more democratic
and more responsive to a broader range of clients than its English counterpart.Id.
47 See Hughes, The Contingent Fee Contract in Masschusetts, 43 B. U. L. REV. 1, 6
(1963) (litigation is not a vice when the claim is supported by law). See also
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 105 S. Ct. 2265 (1985). In Zauderer the
court stated:
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at best, is considered to be a necessary evil in Great Brit-
ain48 and as such is discouraged.49 In the United States,
litigation is not considered a social evil, 50 and a majority
of Americans favor a legal system which provides an ag-
grieved party access to the judicial system .5  Because con-
tingent percentage fees aid clients in obtaining financing
and representation of counsel, 2 contingent percentage
fees have received approval by the American Bar as a
means of providing access to the judicial system.5 3
Contingent percentage fees are widely employed in the
United States and play a major role in financing a large
variety of litigation.54 In addition to the traditional use of
contingent percentage fees by plaintiff's attorneys in per-
sonal injury litigation, contingent percentage fees are em-
ployed in stockholder derivative suits, 5 5 antitrust suits, 56
and worker's compensation cases. 57 In addition, contin-
gent percentage fees are occasionally used by defense
attorneys.58
There is no cause for consternation when a person who believes in
good faith and on the basis of accurate information regarding his
legal rights that he has suffered a legally cognizable injury turns to
the courts for a remedy: "we cannot accept the notion that it is al-
ways better for a person to suffer a wrong silently then to redress it
by legal action."
Id. at 2278, quoting Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 376 (1977).
48 Minish, supra note 10, at 71.
49 Radin, supra note 16, at 68. The English view is based upon the medieval and
Christian position that litigousness is a vice and litigation should be avoided
whenever possible. Id.
- F. MAcKINNON, supra note 1, at 41.
5, See Hughes, supra note 47, at 6.
52 See Corboy, supra note 22, at 28-29. See infra notes 59-67 and accompanying
text for a discussion of how contingent percentage fees aid a plaintiff in financing
litigation.
5- See Comment, Contingent Fee Contracts, supra note 11, at 155.
-' See F. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 4; Comment, Of Ethics and Economics: Con-
tingent Percentage Fees for Legal Services, 16 AKRON L. REV. 747 (1983).
-5 See, e.g., Marine Midland Trust Co. v. Forty Wall Street Corp., 13 A.D.2d 118,
213 N.Y.S.2d 689 (1961).
- See, e.g., International Travel Arrangers, Inc. v. Western Airlines, Inc., 623
F.2d 1255 (8th Cir. 1980).
57 See, e.g., Thatcher v. Indust. Comm., 115 Utah 568, 207 P.2d 178 (1949).
58 See Comment, Toward a Valid Defense Contingent Fee Contract. A Comparative Anal-
ysis, 67 IowA L. REV. 373 (1982); Annot., 9 A.L.R. 4TH 191 (1981).
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II. THE CASE FOR CONTINGENT
PERCENTAGE FEES
Perhaps the strongest argument in favor of contingent
percentage fees is that contingent percentage fees provide
plaintiffs with an affordable means of prosecuting their
claims.59 Without contingent percentage fees, a plaintiff
of modest means might be unwilling or unable to employ
an attorney to protect his legal rights.60  Additionally,
many attorneys are reluctant to handle a case, particularly
a personal injury case, on an hourly fee basis unless the
plaintiff has sufficent assets to guarantee payment of the
attorney's fees. 6' Under a contingent percentage fee sys-
tem, a claimant with a legitimate claim generally will have
few problems in obtaining representation.62
Judge Richard Posner of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit argues that the contingent
percentage fee enables litigants to protect their claims by
permitting lawyers to loan their services to the claimant in
exchange for a share of the claim. 63 Although it is fre-
quently argued that contingent percentage fees are exces-
sive," the contingent percentage fee must be higher than
the hourly fee for the services, because the contingent
percentage fee compensates the attorney for both the
legal services rendered and for the loan value of those
services.65 The percentage (in effect, the interest rate on
C' Gorboy, supra note 22, at 28.
c Cf. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 448 (2d ed. 1977) (where the
costs of litigation are high, the plaintiff may be unable to finance the litigation
himself. Contingent percentage fees enable the plaintiff to prosecute his claim by
loaning the plaintiff the lawyer's services necessary to the action).
6, See generally Corboy, supra note 22, at 34.
62 Merritt v. Faulkner, 697 F.2d 761, 769-71 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J. dissent-
ing). Judge Posner dissented from the appointment of counsel to represent a
prisoner in a personal injury suit. Posner states "that a prisoner who has a good
damages suit should be able to hire a competent lawyer and that by making the
prisoner go this route we subject the probable merit of his case to the test of the
market." Id. at 769.
63 R. POSNER, supra note 60, at 448.
See infra notes 126-137 and accompanying text.
65 R. POSNER, supra note 60, at 448-49.
the loan of the services)66 is high because the risk of de-
fault is considerably higher than with ordinary loans.6 7
Thus, contingent percentage fees provide an effective
means for plaintiffs to obtain legal representation.
Additionally, without representation by counsel, an in-
jured plaintiff is in an inferior bargaining position in seek-
ing compensation from the defendant.68  This is
particularly true when the plaintiff has suffered an injury
which significantly reduces his earning capacity, and the
defendant is a large corporation. 69 Under such circum-
stances, effective representative by counsel is a necessity if
the plaintiff is to deal at arms length with the corporate
defendant. 70  Contingent percentage fees provide plain-
tiffs with a means of obtaining effective counsel to miti-
gate the effects of the plaintiff's inferior bargaining
position.7 '
All litigation involves some risk of failure.72 Contingent
percentage fees arguably enable risk averse plaintiffs to
proceed with litigation by shifting the risk of loss from the
client to the attorney, because the attorney will lose the
6 Id.
67 Id. However, it may be argued that this "interest rate" is excessive since there
is little risk of default in many personal injury cases. Comment, supra note 54, at
751.
- Corboy, supra note 22, at 28.
6 Id. Corboy states:
The theory is that, in most instances, the plaintiff sues specifically
because he is unable to continue leading his life in the same manner
as he did before the incident which injured him. In that situation, he
is less likely than at any other time in his life to be able to afford to
retain and pay legal counsel on an hourly basis. He must obtain rep-
resentation without a requirement that he pay for it out of already
depleted resources. Without counsel, he is unable to overcome the
usually superior bargaining position of the defendant and may go
uncompensated or settle his claim for far less than would be
awarded to him in court.
Id.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 33. "[T]here is a cogent argument that, absent the contingent fee, a
great many plaintiffs with inadequate financial resources would be forced by de-
fendants employing purposeful delay to settle for very small sums in cases in
which they would stand an excellent chance of full compensation in court." Id.
72 See generally R. POSNER, supra note 60, at 448.
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value of his services if the litigation is unsuccessful.7 3 An
attorney will accept a case only if he determines that the
expected recovery74 is greater than the anticipated ex-
penses of the litigation.75 An experienced attorney is in a
better position than the plaintiff to determine if the ex-
pected recovery exceeds the expected litigation ex-
penses.7 6 Thus, a risk averse plaintiff is more likely to
prosecute his claim on a contingent percentage fee basis,
because the plaintiff is not required to risk his personal
assets.7 7
By shifting the risk of loss to the attorney,78 contingent
percentage fees tend to discourage the filing of frivolous
lawsuits. 79 An attorney working under a contingent per-
centage fee contract presumably will not accept a case un-
less he believes that he can make a profit from that case,
7. Schwartz & Mitchell, An Economic Analysis of the Contingent Fee in Personal-Injury
Litigation, 22 STAN L. REV. 1125 (1970). Some contingent percentage fee contracts
do not entirely shift the risk of loss to the attorney by requiring the plaintiff to pay
litigation expenses (e.g., filing fees, deposition costs). Id. However, many attor-
neys do not attempt to collect these expenses unless the litigation is successful.
Clermont & Currivan, supra note 2, at 572 n. 118.
74 Expected recovery equals the potential award discounted for the probability
of success. Clermont & Currivan, supra note 2, at 564 n.84. The expected recov-
ery represents the value of the claim. R. POSNER supra note 60, at 448.
7- See Schwartz & Mitchell, supra note 73, at 1153. The costs of litigation to the
attorney include the direct expenses (e.g. filing fees) as well as the opportunity
cost of the attorney's time. Id. The opportunity cost of the attorney's time repre-
sents the amount the attorney could earn working on another project. Id. at 1134.
Thus, the revenue from other projects which the attorney must forego in order to
accept the personal injury case represents an important consideration for the at-
torney. Id. at 1133-36.
76 Clermont & Currivan, supra note 2, at 572.
77 See Corboy, supra note 22, at 27.
78 See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
79 Clermont & Currivan, supra note 2, at 571. Clermont & Currivan state:
"since [the] contingency makes [the attorney's] fee depend on the outcome, the
lawyer would shy away from any case with a probablity of success so low that it
makes the case a poor investment." Id. In addition, contingent percentage fees
increase the attorney's influence over actions brought by the client. Under an
hourly fee, the burden of screening the merits of the claim is placed more heavily
upon the client, who is not as capable as an attorney of determining the merits of
a claim. Id. at 571-72. See also Corboy, supra note 22, at 32. Corboy states: "the
actual result of using the contingent fee is more probably that meritorious but
difficult suits will have to be declined then that groundless actions will be
brought." Id.
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that is, the attorney's percentage of the expected recovery
exceeds the expected litigation expenses.8 0 Contingent
percentage fees will not prevent the filing of nuisance
suits,8 ' however, attorneys have an ethical responsibility
to avoid bringing vexatious litigation.8 2
Freedom of contract is another argument supporting
contingent percentage fees.83 The right of autonomous
individuals to contract on whatever terms they agree upon
is a basic premise of the free enterprise system.84 Gener-
ally, freedom to contract allows individuals to enter into
agreements which are beneficial to the individual.8 5 This
is particularly true when the contract is negotiated by par-
ties in a competitive market.
In a competitive market, 86 an efficient allocation of re-
o See Schwartz & Mitchell, supra note 73, at 1153 for a hypothetical example of
cases an attorney will accept using economic analysis.
" Nuisance suits are defined as unmeritorious cases brought with the intention
of securing a settlement from the defendant since "the defendant's unrecoverable
attorney fees could run higher than the amount the plaintiff will accept to settle
the case." Rowe, Predicting the Effects of Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 139, 150 (1984). See also Clermont & Currivan, supra note 2, at 573 (no
evidence that contingent fees encourage nuisance suits).
82 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-109 (1982). DR 2-109
states:
(A) A lawyer shall not accept employment on behalf of a person if he
knows it is obvious that such a person wishes to: . . .
(2) Present a claim or defense in litigation that is not warranted
under existing law, unless it can be supported by good faith argu-
ment for an extension, modification, or reversal of the existing law.
Id. A detailed discussion of an attorney's ethical duty to decline frivolous cases is
beyond the scope of this comment. For a detailed discussion see Cann, Frivolous
Lawsuits - The Lawyer's Duty to Say "No", 52 U. COLO. L. REV. 367 (1981). The
most efficient fee system for avoiding frivolous lawsuits would be a fee recoup-
ment system similar to the one employed in Great Britain, since, defendants
would be able to recover their attorney fees from the unsuccessful plaintiff. See
infra notes 207-208 and accompanying text.
83 See generally, Note, Contingent Fee Contracts: Validity, Controls, and Enforceability,
47 IowA L. REV. 942, 943 (1962).
4 See M. FRIEDMAN & R. FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE 20-21 (1979) (voluntary
exchange is a prerequisite for the free enterprise system to function properly).
85 Id. at 5. "[I]f an exchange between two parties is voluntary, it will not take
place unless both believe they will benefit from it." Id.
84 The economic model of perfect competition, with its assumptions of (1) a
large number of firms, (2) a perfectly homogeneous product, (3) perfect mobility
of all resources, and (4) perfect knowledge by all market participants, C. FERGU-
SON & S. MAURICE, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS THEORY AND APPLICATION 278-79 (1978),
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sources will be achieved when individuals are permitted to
reach mutually acceptable agreements. 87 Since each mar-
ket participant acts in his self interest, resources are allo-
cated to the person who values the goods or services most
highly.88 In order for a market to operate competitively,
several conditions must be met. First, there must be a suf-
ficiently large number of competitors in the market so that
represents a theoretical abstraction from reality. D. GREER, INDUSTRIAL ORGANI-
ZATION & PUBLIC POLICY 43 (1980). Greer offers the concept of "workable compe-
tition" and a set of operational standards by which the market may be judged.
Structural Norms
1. The number of traders should be at least as large as scale econo-
mies permit.
2. There should be no artificial inhibitions on mobility and entry.
3. Where appropriate, there should be moderate and price-sensitive
quality differentials in the products offered.
4. Buyers should be well informed about prices, quality, and other
relevant data.
Conduct Criteria
5. Some uncertainty should exist in the minds of rivals as to whether
price initiatives will be followed.
6. Firms should strive to achieve their goals independently, without
collusion.
7. There should be no unfair, exclusionary, predatory, or coercive
tactics.
8. Inefficient suppliers and customers should not be shielded
permanently.
9. Sales promotion should not be misleading.
10. Persistent, harmful price discrimination should be absent.
Performance Criteria
11. Firms' production operations should be efficient.
12. Promotional expenses should not be excessive.
13. Profits should be at levels just sufficient to reward investment,
efficiency, and innovation.
14. Output levels and the range of qualities should be responsive to
consumer demands.
15. Opportunities for introducing technically superior new products
and processes should be exploited.
16. Prices should not intensify cyclical instability or inflation.
17. Success should accrue to sellers who best serve consumer wants.
Id. at 46-47. This comment uses the more reasonable standard of "workable com-
petition" rather than the theoretical perfect competition in analyzing the competi-
tiveness of the legal market for personal injury litigation.
87 Cf M. FRIEDMAN & R. FRIEDMAN, supra note 84, at 5-19.
" A free market directs goods or services to those persons who value the goods
or services at the market price or higher. Individuals who value the goods or
services at less than the market price will purchase other products which they
value more highly. For a detailed discussion of the role of the price system see C.
FERGUSON & S. MAURICE, supra note 86, at 123-68.
no one competitor dominates the market.8 9 Second, sell-
ers must be offering a reasonably similar or homogeneous
product or service. 90 Third, new buyers and sellers must
be able to enter the market, and established market par-
ticipants must be able to exit the market.9' Finally, con-
sumers must have sufficient information about the price
and quality of the goods or services offered by sellers in
order to make an informed decision.9 2
Applying the above described model to the legal mar-
ket, the first requirement is satisfied as there are many at-
torneys in the United States who handle personal injury
litigation. Second, each personal injury attorney offers a
similar service, although there are variations in the quality
of the services rendered.93 Additionally, it is possible for
attorneys to enter or exit from personal injury practice
depending upon what the attorney believes to be in his
best interest. 94 There are no artificial barriers to entry in
personal injury practice imposed by bar associations or
governments .
The lack of adequate information concerning the legal
market presents a problem.96 This lack of information is
usually manifested in one of two situations: (1) potential
clients are unable to determine which lawyer is competent




93The existence of quality differentials in attorney services points out the need
for greater consumer information about the personal injury market. See infra
notes 100-111 and accompanying text.
- There are barriers to entry to the legal profession as a whole, such as the
requirements that attorneys be graduates from an ABA approved law school and
pass a state bar examination. However, there are no restrictions on entry into
personal injury practice per se. For a discussion of the effects of occupational
licensing on the price system see M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 137-160
(1962).
9.5 However, an attorney may not hold himself out to the public as a specialist
unless he meets the requirements established by the state bar for specialists. See
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBLITY DR 2-105 (A)(3) (1982).
16 See Schuck, Consumer Ignorance and Legal Advertising, 43 INS. COUNS. J. 568
(1976); Grady, Some Ethical Questions About Percentage Fees, LITGATION, Summer
1976, at 20, 25-26.
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to handle their case,97 and (2) potential clients overesti-
mate the cost of seeking legal assistance, and this overesti-
mation leads individuals to seek legal counsel to a lesser
extent than if they had reliable fee information.98 One
survey suggests that lack of adequate information regard-
ing the price and quality of legal services is a major reason
why people do not seek legal advice. 99
The adequacy of information provided to consumers ef-
fects the efficiency of the legal market. 00 Efficiency is re-
warded only if the efficiency is made known to the
public.' 0 1 If consumers of legal services do not have ade-
quate information about the price and quality of legal
services, then they may pay more than necessary for legal
services. 0 2 Additionally, the lack of market information
may place consumers in an inferior bargaining position
with attorneys, because the consumer may be unaware
that the same service is available elsewhere at a lower
price. 103
Advertising provides an effective means of conveying
market information to consumers. 0 4 Prior to the United
States Supreme Court's holding in Bates v. State Bar of Ari-
zona, 0 5 advertising by lawyers was strictly prohibited.'0 6
1,7 Schuck, supra note 96, at 568.
98 Id. Schuck argues that the organized bar's responses to the information
problem, lawyer referral services and use of lawyer lists, such as the Martindale-
Hubbell Legal Directory, have been largely ineffective, since these sources do not
supply the consumer with a significantly greater amount of information. Id. at
568-69.
- Id. at 568. Eighty percent of those surveyed by the American Bar Foundation
thought that many people do not seek legal advice because of the difficulty of
indentifying competent lawyers. Id.
1- Id. at 569.
10, Id.
1o2 C. FERGUSON & S. MAURICE, supra note 86, at 279.
10, Grady, supra note 96, at 25-26. Most personal injury lawyers do not inform
their clients that representation is available on a basis other than a percentage
basis, such as a certain hourly fee. Id.
'o See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 374 (1977) (advertising pro-
vides consumers with at least some relevant information necessary to reach an
informed decision).
lo., 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
1- In re R.MJ., 455 U.S. 191, 193 (1982).
In Bates, the Court held the First Amendment guarantees
attorneys the right to advertise routine legal services.' °7
Following Bates, the ABA enacted DR 2-101 which lists
twenty five categories of information which attorneys are
permitted to advertise.' 0 8  The Supreme Court has re-
cently held that all attorney advertising which is not mis-
leading is entitled to First Amendment protection, 0 9
calling into question the continued validity of the adver-
tising restrictions listed in DR 2-101.tt° Thus, the recent
availability of advertising has provided consumers with
significantly greater information about the price and qual-
ity of legal services."'
It is frequently argued that contingent percentage fees
result in plaintiff's attorneys receiving excessive fees.
' 2
If contingent percentage fees result in excessive fees, then
this is evidence that consumers have insufficient market
information. 13 If attorney's fees are greater than equilib-
rium rate and there is adequate market information,"14
then an attorney could increase his profits by lowering his
fee, because the attorney would attract more clients by
publicizing his lower fee.' 15 However, the attorney's prof-
107 Bates, 433 U.S. at 367-68.
108 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(b)(1-25) (1982).
The Model Code permitted attorneys to advertise contingent fee rates. Id. at D.R.
2-101(b)(22).
1- In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203. For a discussion of regulation of attorney ad-
vertising see Stoltenberg & Whitman, Direct MailAdvertising by Lawyers, 45 U. PITr.
L. REV. 381 (1984); Note, In re R.M.J. : The Scope of Lawyer Advertising Expands,
1983 UTAH L. REV. 99.
110 See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 105 S. Ct. 1165, 2280-84
(1985) (use of accurate and not misleading illustrations in lawyer advertising is
protected commercial speech under the First Amendment).
III See supra notes 104-109 and accompanying text.
112 See infra notes 126-137 and accompanying text.
1,2 Adequate market information is a requirement for the efficient functioning
of a competitive market. See supra notes 96-103 and accompanying text.
114 The equilibrium price is the price established by the interaction of market
supply and demand in a competitive market. R. DORFMAN, PRICES AND MARKETS
23-25 (1978).
"5 See C. FERGUSON & S. MAURICE, supra note 86, at 46-49. "When price is
above the equilibrium price, quantity supplied exceeds quantity demanded. The
resulting excess supply induces sellers to reduce price in order to sell the sur-
plus." Id. at 49.
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its would not increase unless consumers are able to learn
about the lower fee." 6 Thus, the availability of adequate
market information plays a key role in the efficient func-
tioning of the legal market.
The majority of the arguments favoring contingent per-
centage fees focus the advantages resulting from the con-
tingent nature of the fee." 17 Thus, these arguments would
apply equally to any contingent fee, including a contin-
gent hourly fee"t8 or a combination contingent hourly-
percentage fee.1'19
III. THE CASE AGAINST CONTINGENT
PERCENTAGE FEES
Objections to contingent percentage fees may be bro-
ken down into two categories. Objections may be made
to either the contingent or the percentage nature of the
fee.
A. Objections Based on Contingent Nature of the Fee
"Overreaching" by the attorney in setting the fee is one
problem resulting from the contingent nature of the
fee.' 20 Because the percentage is set in advance of the
trial or settlement and is contingent on recovery, the
plaintiff may not carefully consider the size of the fee. 12 1
However, this problem could be alleviated by the free
market if consumers have enough information to allow
the plaintiff to choose an attorney who charges a reason-
' - Schuck, supra note 96, at 569. "The market only rewards efficiency if the
efficient can make their efficiency known to consumers." Id.
117 Those arguments favoring contingent percentage fees which emphasize the
contingent nature of the fee are: (1) providing plaintiffs of moderate resources
access to the legal system, (2) shifting risk of loss to the attorney, and (3) discour-
aging the filing of frivolous lawsuits. See Clermont & Currivan, supra note 2, at
569-73.
I'l See infra notes 181-187 and accompanying text for a discussion of contin-
gent hourly fees.
119 See infra notes 188-206 and accompanying text for a discussion of the pro-
posed contingent hourly-percentage fee.




Another frequently encountered argument against the
contingent nature of fees is that the speculative nature of
contingent fees downgrades the legal profession to a
mere business. 123 It is argued that contingency fees cause
the attorney to abandon his role as a counselor and as-
sume the position of a partner in the litigation.' 24 These
arguments ignore the realities of modern legal practice.
An attorney is engaged in a business; attorneys practice
law not only to provide a service to the public but also to
make money. 25
B. Arguments Based on the Percentage Nature of the Fee
The strongest argument against percentage fees is that
percentage fees may be excessive under some circum-
stances.' 26  Attorneys are prohibited from charging a
"clearly excessive fee."'127 A fee is considered clearly ex-
"2 See supra notes 86-111 and accompanying text. If the legal market was com-
petitive, competing suppliers (attorneys) would bid the percentage down to the
equilibrium price. See supra notes 111-118 and accompanying text.
1" Clermont & Currivan, supra note 2, at 570. These arguments are based
upon the medieval view of attorneys as public servants and of attorney's fees as a
voluntary honorarium. See Comment, Are Contingent Fees Ethical, supra note 11, at
334-35.
'2 See White, supra note 14, at 292. White argues that it is not necessarily bad
for an attorney to have an interest in the outcome of litigation since the client
retains an attorney in order to win. If providing the attorney with an interest aids
the client in obtaining victory, then the practice is beneficial. Id. at 292-93.
'2 See Id. at 291. "Any attempt to deny the commercial aspects of the practice
of law in 1978 must be condemed as unreal. No longer can it be pretended that
fees are mere honoraria for a service to justice. Lawyers are in business and run
their practices in the main as businesses." Id.
12 See Grady, supra note 96, at 24-25.
'27 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106 (1982). DR 2-106
provides eight factors which should be considered in determining if a fee is
reasonable:
(1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the
questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal ser-
vice properly.
(2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of
the particular employment will preclude other employment by the
lawyer.
(3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal
services.
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cessive when "a lawyer of ordinary prudence would be left
with a definite and firm conviction that the fee is in excess
of a reasonable fee."'128
The Arizona Supreme court recently held a contingent
percentage fee contract to be a "clearly excessive fee"
suspended the attorney for six months.' 29 The attorney
agreed to represent the plaintiff for a contingent percent-
age fee of thirty-three percent. 30 The defendant's insur-
ance company agreed to settle for the full policy limit and
the attorney was not required to file a lawsuit.' 3' The at-
(4) The amount involved and the results obtained.
(5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the
circumstances.
(6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the
client.
(7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers
performing the services.
(8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
Id.
Rule 1.5 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct requires a lawyer's fee to
be reasonable. The reasonableness of the fee is to be determined by reference to
the same factors as listed above. The official comments to Rule 1.5 suggest that
an attorney should provide the client with alternative fee arrangements if there is
any doubt concerning the appropriateness of a contingent fee. MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULE 1.5 (1983). The Model Rules were adopted by the
ABA in 1983 to replace the Model Code. The Model Code is important, however,
since the disciplinary rules of most states are based upon the Model Code provi-
sions. As of this writing five states have adopted the Model Rules.
128 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106 (1982). A number
of courts have held that trial courts must consider the factors enumerated in DR
2-106 and Rule 1.5 in determining the reasonableness of an attorney's fee. See,
e.g., Shutts v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 235 Kan. 195, 679 P.2d 1159, 1182 (1984)
(factors listed in DR 2-106 are to be considered in determining reasonable attor-
ney's fees in a class action suit); Murphy v. Grisham, 625 S.W.2d 215, 217 (Mo.
App. 1981) (trial court required to consider factors similiar to those contained in
the code); Alan D. Nicholson, Inc. v. Cannon, 674 P.2d 506, 508 (Mont. 1984)
(factors enumerated in DR-2-106 are to considered, although other factors may
also be considered); Pyle v. Pyle, 11 Ohio App.3d 31, 403 N.E.2d 98, 104 (1983)
(factors listed in the code of professional responsibility are to be applied in deter-
mining if attorney fees are reasonable); Ewell v. Ewell, 279 S.C. 601, 310 S.E.2d
436, 438 (1983) (factors similar to those listed in DR 2-106 are to be considered
in determining reasonableness); Adams v. Mellen, 618 S.W.2d 485, 489 (Tenn.
App. 1981) (listed several factors similar to those contained in the code which
must be considered in determining reasonableness).
In re Swartz, 141 Ariz. 266, 689 P.2d 1236 (1984).
Id. at 1239.
Id.
torney received one-third of the plaintiff's total recovery
($50,000) as compensation under the contract.' 32 The
Arizona Supreme Court held this fee "clearly excessive"
because (1) there was no contingency (liability was admit-
ted);133 (2) the damages were limited to the policy lim-
its;1 3 4 (3) Swartz was not required to file a lawsuit to force
the settlement; 3 5 and (4) the policy limits were known al-
most immediately.' 3 6 The court concluded that an attor-
ney has a duty to reduce a percentage fee to a reasonable
percentage and to collect no more than a reasonable
amount in light of the time and effort he devoted to the
case. 17
The Colorado Supreme Court recently suspended an
attorney for six months for charging a "clearly excessive
fee" in People v. Nutt.'3 8 In Nutt, the attorney entered into
a contract under which his compensation was based upon
a percentage of any oil and gas royalties received by his
client. 1 9 The court held that the attorney violated Disci-
plinary Rule 2-106 because the attorney's services were
valued at no more than $18,272.78 during his period of
employment, even though the attorney was willing to ac-
cept as much as $200,000 as compensation under the
terms of the fee arrangement.' 40 Thus, the court con-
cluded that there was no relation between the services
provided by the attorney and the fee charged.' 41
It is argued that contingent percentage fees are fre-
quently excessive in disaster litigation in which an attor-
ney represents several plaintiffs.' 4 2 An attorney's fixed
costs in representing one plaintiff are high. However, be-
132 Id. at 1240.




1 i7 Id. at 1244.
-1, 696 P.2d 242 (Colo. 1984).
-9" Id. at 244.
140 Id, at 248.
141 Id. at 243.
142 Grady, supra note 96, at 21-22.
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cause in disaster litigation, many of the legal and factual
issues are the same for a number of potential plaintiffs, an
attorney's marginal costs in representing each additional
plaintiff is low.' 43 Thus, because the attorney charges the
same percentage fee to each plaintiff, a potential for ex-
cessive profits exists.' 44
A related argument against percentage fees is that per-
centage fees "measure poorly both the cost to the lawyer
and the value to the client of the legal services ren-
dered."14 5 Under a percentage fee contract, the extent of
the client's injuries determines the attorney's fee. 146 The
amount of time expended by the attorney does not enter
into the calculation of the fee. '47
Unquestionably, percentage fees are generally higher
than hourly fees. 148  This higher fee essentially has two
components: (1) a risk premium, that is the attorney must
be compensated for assuming the risk of failure; 49 and (2)
interest on the loan of the attorney's services. 5 ' Addi-
tionally, if the legal market is competitive, and if attorney
fees are excessive, then additional attorneys can be ex-
pected to enter into personal injury practice and drive
down the percentage charged.' 5 1 However, because in-
creased market entry has not been observed, either the
fees charged by personal injury attorneys are not exces-
143 Cf id. (In disaster litigation, the same general facts will apply to each plain-
tiff's, case thus, the attorney's costs are unlikely to be increased substantially by
representing additional plaintiffs).
144 Id. For example, if cases are accepted on a one-third contingency, then the
attorney will receive one-third of the award to each accident victim he represents.
The attorney's costs will not be substantially increased by the additional plaintiffs,
thus the attorney's profits from the litigation will be increased.
14. Clermont & Currivan, supra note 2, at 573.
14o Grady, supra note 96, at 21.
147 The formula for contingent percentage fees is F=XS; where F is the attor-
ney's fee, X is the percentage, and S is the settlement or award.
14H See R. POSNER, supra note 60, at 448.
140 Id. at 448-49.
- Id. It is also argued that the percentage fee is a better estimate of the actual
cost of the litigation than is an hourly fee because an hourly fee considers only the
value of the attorney's time, and does not take risk into account. See supra notes
63-67 and accompanying text.
'.11 See supra note 115.
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sive or consumers have insufficient information to deter-
mine that legal services are available at lower prices.' 52
Additionally, some critics contend that contingent per-
centage fees result in a conflict between the economic in-
terests of the attorney and those of the client. 153 Because
the attorney's compensation is not a function of the
number of hours worked, 54 the attorney has an incentive
to reach a reasonable settlement as quickly as possible.15 5
Similarly, because the client is not required to compen-
sate the attorney on an hourly basis, the client will want
the attorney to work the number of hours necessary to
maximize his recovery.' 56 This conflict of interest occurs
because percentage fees fail to take the attorney's time
into account in determining the fee; the size of the fee is
entirely determined by the size of the client's recovery.' 57
Additionally, other critics contend that contingent per-
centage fees result in larger awards by juries. 15  This ar-
gument states that juries tend to give higher awards
because it is commonly perceived by jurors that a substan-
152 See supra notes 96-103 and accompanying text.
153 Clermont & Currivan, supra note 2, at 534.
1-54 See Schwartz & Mitchell, supra note 73, at 1133-34. The attorney's fee is
equal to the percentage times the recovery.
1-55 Clermont & Currivan, supra note 2, at 543-46. Every case has a maximum
value regardless of how many hours an attorney works. Schwartz & Mitchell, supra
note 73, at 1129. The recovery increases rapidly with the first few hours the attor-
ney works, however, as the maximum value is approached, the amount of increase
declines. Id. at 1130, figure 1. An attorney employed on a percentage basis maxi-
mizes his profits at the point where his share of the recovery exceeds his usual
hourly fee by the largest amount. Clermont & Currivan, supra note 2, at 544,
figure 3.
'5I Clermont & Currivan, supra note 2, at 536. Clermont and Currivan state:
Because the client's net recovery varies directly with the gross recov-
ery, and because the client must pay a fixed percentage fee without
regard to the number of hours worked, the client's economic inter-
ests are best served when the lawyer devotes a very large number of
hours to ensure the maximum settlement or judgment. However,
. .the lawyer optimizes his own economic position by working a
much smaller number of hours; direct economic incentive prods him
to obtain a respectable settlement with relatively slight effort, thus
securing for himself the maximum profit.
Id.
'.5 Grady, supra note 96, at 21.
1-1 Thomas, supra note 11, at 42.
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tial portion of the plaintiff's recovery will go to the pay-
ment of attorney's fees.' 59 There is, however, no
empirical evidence to support the argument that contin-
gent percentage fees lead to inflated awards by juries. 60
IV. PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES TO CONTINGENT
PERCENTAGE FEES
Several proposed alternatives to the customary contin-
gent percentage fee are examined in this section. The rel-
ative advantages and disadvantages of each proposed
alternative will also be examined.
A. Non-Contingent Hourly Fees
An obvious alternative to contingent percentage fees
are hourly fees which are not contingent upon the out-
come of the litigation.' 6' Hourly fees are commonly em-
ployed in commercial litigation and in defending personal
injury actions because most commercial clients are able to
pay for legal services on an hourly basis. However, per-
sonal injury plaintiff's attorneys seldom emply hourly
fees, because many personal injury plaintiffs are unable to
guarantee payment on noncontingent hourly basis. 162
The principal advantage of non-contingent hourly fees
is that such fees base the attorney's fee upon the number
of hours the attorney has actually worked. 163 An hourly
fee avoids the problems resulting from having the fee de-
pendent upon the size of the award, rather than the efforts
of the attorney.164 Additionally, it is frequently argued
159 Id. Thomas states: "[I]n the USA juries are said to recognize that a substan-
tial part of any award must be paid to the lawyer and compensate by increasing
the amount of their award." Id.
-0 Kalven, The Juty, the Law, and the Personal Injury Damage Award, 19 OHIO ST. L.
J. 158, 176-77 (1958).
-16 Clermont & Currivan, supra note 2, at 532-33.
162 F. MAcKINNON, supra note 1, at 4.
16. See Clermont & Currivan, supra note 2, at 568. The formula for computing an
hourly fee is F=WH, where F is the amount of the fee, W is the attorney's hourly
rate, and H is the number of hours worked. Id. at 547-50.
'- See supra notes 153-157 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
problems associated with the computation of percentage fees.
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that hourly fees more accurately reflect the cost of the at-
torney's services than percentage fees.' 6 5 However, this
argument ignores two elements of the percentage fee, the
risk premium and the interest feature.' Thus, it is an
unanswered question whether hourly fees actually repre-
sent a more accurate reflection of the cost of the attor-
ney's services. 1
67
The principal disadvantage of hourly fees in personal
injury litigation is that such fees may discourage risk
averse individuals from seeking legal counsel.'6  The cli-
ent assumes the entire risk of loss when litigation is con-
ducted on a hourly fee basis.' 69 Many accident victims
would be unable to afford to retain counsel on an hourly
fee basis because they may have incurred significant medi-
cal expenses and may face a reduced earnings poten-
tial.170 In addition, risk averse clients may be unwilling to
face this risk of loss. 17 1 Moreover, attorneys generally
seek assurance of payment before agreeing to perform
165 See Clermont & Currivan, supra note 1, at 577. An hourly fee provides a
good measure of the cost to the attorney of providing the services, although it
provides an imperfect measure of the value of the attorney's services to the client,
since the results of the litigation also enter into the client's valuation of the attor-
ney's services. Id. It is sometimes argued that the size of the plaintiff's recovery
should not be considered in determining the attorney's fee since the amount of
the recovery is largely the fortuitous result of the extent of the plaintiff's injuries.
Grady, supra note 96, at 21-23.
1- R. POSNER, supra note 60, at 448-49.
167 See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
-6 Clermont & Currivan, supra note 2, at 567.
6 Id. Under a non-contingent hourly fee the plaintiff assumes the risk of loss
because if the litigation is unsuccessful, the client must pay his attorney for ser-
vices rendered.
170 See Corboy, supra note 22, at 28. Corboy argues that an injured plaintiff is
unlikely to be able to afford an hourly fee since "he [the client] is unable to con-
tinue leading his life in the same manner as he did before the accident which
injured him." Id.
171 Schwartz & Mitchell, supra note 73, at 1150. "Particularly for clients with
low financial resources, the risk of losing money after already having sustained the
initial injury may prevent them from pursuing the case." Id. Corboy suggests that
non-contingent hourly fees result in most clients basing their decisions on the
prospects of having to pay the attorney regardless of the outcome. Corboy, supra
note 22, at 34. See also Clermont & Currivan, supra note 2, at 567 n.92 (arguments
concerning availability of legal services to the poor apply equally to risk averse
clients).
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any services, and many accident victims have inadequate
financial resources to provide such an assurance. 172 Thus,
an hourly fee is not as effective as a contingent fee 7 3 in
providing access to the legal system for lower and middle
income claimants. 174
Another problem associated with hourly fees is that an
economic conflict of interest may exist between the attor-
ney and client. 75 This conflict of interest presents the op-
posite situation from the conflict described for contingent
percentage fees.' 76  Because the attorney's fee increases
by equal increments with each hour worked, the attorney
is indifferent as to the number of hours he should work. 177
However, the client wants the attorney to work only the
number of hours necessary to maximize his net recov-
ery.'17 The client's net recovery is maximized when the
difference between the gross recovery and the attorney's
fee is greatest. 79 Since the attorney's fee is based solely
on the number of hours worked, the attorney does not
have a direct economic incentive to work the number of
172 Clermont & Currivan, supra note 2, at 567 (poor clients, even if willing to
accept the risk of loss, may have insufficent resources to provide the attorney with
assurance of payment).
173 The term contingent fee is used generically to include any fee which is de-
pendent upon the attorney securing a recovery for the client.
174 See supra notes 59-77 and accompanying text.
17. Clermont & Currivan, supra note 2, at 534-35. Clermont & Currivan identify
two potential conflicts of interest: (1) The attorney may not have a direct eco-
nomic incentive to work for the client's victory since the attorney's fee is unrelated
to the outcome of the case, and (2) the lawyer does not have an incentive to work
the number of hours necessary to maximize the client's recovery since the lawyer's
profits may be maximized by working a different number of hours. Id. at 534.
Both of these potential conflicts exist under a certain hourly fee arrangement. In
contrast with a contingent fee, the attorney has a direct economic incentive to
work for the client's victory.
176 See supra notes 153-157 and accompanying text. Under a contingent per-
centage fee arrangement the attorney has an incentive to work fewer hours than
desired by the client.
177 See Clermont & Currivan, supra note 2, at 542-43. Since the attorney re-
ceives the same amount for each hour worked, he has no direct incentive to work
the number of hours required to maximize the client's net recovery. Id.
178 Id. at 540-42.
179 Id. at 542. At the point where the client's net recovery is maximized, an
additional hour of work by the attorney would increase the recovery by an amount
equal to the attorney's fee. Id.
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hours desired by the client. 8 0
B. Contingent Hourly Fees
A contingent hourly fee is an hourly fee, the payment of
which is conditioned upon the outcome of the case.' 8 ' A
contingent hourly fee retains those advantages of the con-
tingent percentage fee which result from the contingent
nature of the fee.18 2 Additionally, a contingent hourly fee
retains the major benefit of non-contingent hourly fees;
the time actually expended by the attorney enters into the
calculation of the fee.18 3
The major disadvantage associated with contingent
hourly fees is that this fee arrangement is rarely offered by
attorneys. 84  Additionally, the problems of overreach-
ing 85 and promotion of speculation by attorneys, 186 in-
herent in any contingent fee are also present with the
contingent hourly fee. Moreover, the same economic
conflict of interest present in non-contingent hourly fees
still exists because the attorney does not have a direct
economic incentive to work the number of hours neces-
sary to maximize the client's net recovery.18 7
C. Contingent Hourly-Percentage Fee
Professors Clermont and Currivan propose a hybrid fee
18o Id. at 543.
18, Schwartz & Mitchell, supra note 73, at 1125. An attorney working on a con-
tingent hourly basis would charge a risk premium and an interest charge for the
loan of the attorney's services. See R. POSNER, supra note 60, at 448-49.
182 Specifically, the contingent nature of the fee would allow the plaintiff to shift
the risk of loss to the attorney and thus would not discourage lower income plain-
tiffs from seeking legal counsel. See supra notes 59-71 and accompanying text.
'8 See supra notes 163-167 and accompanying text.
,84 See Kritzer, supra note 13, at 130. "One would be hard pressed in the United
States to find a lawyer who would accept a contingency arrangement for an hourly
fee calculation." Id.
1"- See supra notes 123-125 and accompanying text.
1'6 See supra notes 175-180 and accompanying text. The attorney has an incen-
tive to work the number of hours necessary for the client to prevail, since the
attorney receives no fee if the client receives no recovery. See Clermont & Cur-
rivan, supra note 2, at 534-35.
187 Clermont & Currivan, supra note 2, at 534.
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arrangement, the contingent hourly-percentage fee, 188
designed to eliminate many of the problems associated
with both the contingent percentage and hourly fees.' 89
The contingent hourly-percentage fee would be com-
puted by taking the sum of (1) the attorney's hourly rate
times the number of hours worked and (2) "a percentage
. of the amount by which the gross recovery exceeds
that time charge."' 90 For example, if the gross settlement
is $25,000, the attorney's usual hourly fee is fifty dollars,
the attorney worked thirty hours, and the applicable per-
centage is ten percent, then the attorney's fee would be
$3850.191
The contingent hourly-percentage fee combines the ad-
vantages of both hourly 92 and percentage fees. 93 Ac-
cordingly, the contingent hourly-percentage fee provides
a good measure of both the costs to the lawyer of provid-
ing the service and of the value of the attorney's services
to the client. 194 The hourly component of the fee pro-
vides a good estimate of the cost to the attorney because it
represents the attorney's opportunity cost in providing
'i' Id. at 537.
189 Id. at 598. Clermont & Currivan argue that:
This contingent hourly-percentage fee largely solves the problem of
economic conflict of interest between lawyer and client, a problem
that exists under both the certain hourly fee and the contingent per-
centage fee. It also solves or minimizes many of the other problems
associated with these two basic fee systems. Because of its contin-
gency the proposed fee facilitates access by the poor to legal serv-
ices. Moreover, it measures well the cost to the lawyer and the value
to the client of the legal services rendered - certainly better than
does either a pure hourly or a pure percentage fee.
Id.
190 Id. at 549. The contingent hourly-percentage fee may be expressed mathe-
matically as F = WH + X (S - WH) where F equals the fee, W is the attorney's
hourly fee, H is the number of hours worked, X is the applicable percentage, and
S is the gross settlement.
, (50 X 30) + .10 (25,000 - (50 x 30) = $3850.
1..2 See supra notes 163-167 and accompanying text for a discussion of the advan-
tages of hourly fees.
' See supra notes 59-118 and accompanying text for a discussion of the advan-
tages of percentage fees.
- Clermont & Currivan, supra note 2, at 578-79.
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the service. 95 The percentage feature measures the value
to the client, which is the amount recovered.' 96
Additionally, the contingent hourly-percentage fee
reduces the economic conflict of interest between the at-
torney and client.' 97 The attorney has an incentive to
work the number of hours which will maximize his
profit,' 98 while the client wants the attorney to work the
number of hours that maximize his net recovery. 99 The
attorney's profit will be maximized when his marginal rev-
enue (the increase in fee from working one additional
hour)200 equals the marginal cost (the hourly rate)of work-
ing an additional hour.20 ' The client's net recovery is
maximized when the difference between the gross recov-
ery and the attorney's fee is greatest.20 2 Under contingent
hourly percentage fee arrangements, these figures tend to
coincide.20 3
19. The opportunity cost represents what must be given up in order to produce
the services. See R. DORFMAN, supra note 114, at 74-75. This comment will assume
that the opportunity cost of the lawyers services is the lawyer's usual hourly rate.
1,,1 Clermont & Currivan, supra note 2, at 569.
197 Id. at 598.
, Id. at 598-99. The attorney's profits are maximized when the difference
between the fee provided by the contingent hourly-percentage fee and the attor-
ney's hourly fee is greatest. Id.
'- Id. at 541-42. The client's net recovery is maximized when the difference
between the gross recovery and the attorney's fee is greatest. Id.
21H1 See id. at 549 n.47.
201 Marginal cost is defined as the change in cost when one additional unit (e.g.
one additional hour of lawyer services) is produced. See C. FERGUSON & S. MAU-
RICE, supra note 86, at 240.
202 See supra note 199.
2'-3 Clermont & Currivan, supra note 2, at 550. Table I provides a hypothetical
example demonstrating the superiority of the proposed contingent hourly-per-
centage fee in aligning the economic interests of the attorney and the client. Ta-
ble I assumes a claim in which the maximum recovery is $10,000. Additionally,
the attorney's usual hourly fee is $50. Under a contingent hourly fee, the client's
net recovery is maximized when the attorney works fifteen hours, while the attor-
ney's profit is maximized by working seventeen hours. Under a contingent per-
centage fee arrangement of thirty-three percent, the client's net recovery is
maximized when the maximum recovery is obtained, thus the client is indifferent
as to the number of hours the attorney works. However, the attorney's profits are
maximized when he works thirteen hours. The contingent hourly fee has the
same problem as the non-contingent hourly fee, the attorney's profit is maximized
when he works seventeen hours, the client's net recovery is maximized when the
attorney works thirteen or fourteen hours. Under the contingent hourly-percent-
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The chief disadvantage of the contingent hourly-per-
centage fee is the difficulty in implementing such a
scheme. °4 Clermont and Curriven recognize this diffi-
culty when they state that the proposed fee would proba-
bly have to be introduced in court-awarded attorney's
fees. 20 5 Additionally, the proposed fee contains some of
the same disadvantages as any contingent fee such as
"overreaching" and making the attorney a partner in the
litigation. °6
D. Fee Shifting
Fee shifting, or requiring the defeated party to pay the
attorneys fees of the prevailing party, has been suggested
as an alternative to contingent percentage fees.20 7 In the
United States, the prevailing party is generally not enti-
tled to recover his attorney's fees from the losing party. 0
"The United States is virtually alone among the industri-
alized democracies in having as its basic rule that each
side pays its own lawyer, win or lose. ' 20 9 For example, in
Great Britain the defeated party pays the attorney fees in-
age fee, both the client's net recovery and the attorney's profits are maximized
when the attorney works fifteen hours. Thus, the contingent hourly-percentage
fee best aligns the economic interests of the attorney and the client because both
parties want the attorney to work the same number of hours.
24. Contingent percentage fees have been the traditional method of financing
personal injury litigation and it is unlikely that the plaintiff's bar would adopt the
contingent hourly-percentage fee voluntarily. Clermont & Currivan suggest that
the new fee be implemented by bar associations or by courts. Clermont & Cur-
rivan, supra note 2, at 584.
2".1 Id at 384 n.185.
2.X1 See supra notes 120-125 and accompanying text.
2 7 See Corboy, supra note 22, at 33-34.
208 See Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975)
(prevailing party is not entitled to recover attorney fees in the absence of a statu-
tory authorization or unless an exception to the American Rule, such as bad faith,
is applicable). See Leubsdorf, Toward a Historylof the American Rule on Attorney
Fee Recovery, 47 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 9 (1984) for a discussion of the devel-
opment of the American rule. For discussion of the exceptions to the American
Rule see Comment, Theories of Recoverying Attorney's Fees: Exceptions to the American
Rule, 47 UMKC L. REV. 566 (1979).
2(m, Rowe, supra note 81, at 139.
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curred by the prevailing party. 10
Two types of fee shifting systems are currently em-
ployed.2 1 1 A "two-way" fee shifting system requires the
losing party to pay the attorney fees of the prevailing
party.212 An example of a "two-way" fee shifting system is
that employed in Great Britain. 3 Alternatively, a "one-
way" system, which favors one party to the litigation may
be used.2 1 4 Frequently, these "one-way" fee shfiting ar-
rangements favor plaintiffs, that is, only the defeated de-
fendant must pay the prevailing plaintiff's attorney's
fees. 2 15 The Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act 216 pro-
vides an example of a one-way fee shifting system.217
"Two-way" fee shifting tends to discourage the filing of
nuisance suits. 2 " Fee shifting discourages nuisance litiga-
tion because the plaintiff is liable for the defendant's at-
torney's fees if the litigation is unsuccessful. 1
Additionally, a defendant would have an incentive to liti-
gate nuisance claims, because he could recover his litiga-
tion expenses from the unsuccessful plaintiff.220
Additionally, fee shifting encourages plaintiffs to bring
small, meritorious cases.22' These small claims might not
2- See Pfenningstorf, The European Experience with Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 37 (1984).
2, Rowe, supra note 81, at 140-41.
212 Id. at 141. Great Britain employs a "two-way" fee shifting arrangement. Ad-
ditionally, Alaska has adopted a general "two-way" fee shifting scheme. ALAsKA
R. Civ. P. 82. See Comment, Award of Attorney's Fees in Alaska: An Analysis of Rule 82,
4 UCLA-AtAsKA L. REv. 129 (1974) for a discussion of the effects of fee shifting in
Alaska.
21- See Corboy, supra note 22, at 31.
24 Rowe, supra note 81, at 141.
21- See, e.g., TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(d) (Vernon Supp. 1985)
(Under Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act, a prevailing
consumer is entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees). However, "one-way"
fee shifts systems could favor defendants rather than plaintiffs. Rowe, supra note
81, at 141 n.8.
2- TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-17.62 (Vernon Supp. 1985).
217 Id. § 17.50(d).
2 , Rowe, supra note 81, at 150-53.
2.. Id. at 151.
220 Id.
22) Id. at 148-49. Contra Corboy, supra note 22, at 34 (fee shifting would dis-
courage claimants from bringing meritorious suits).
COMMENT
be prosecuted otherwise, because the plaintiff's attorney's
fees may exceed the recovery.2 22 In fact, the enforcement
of small claims is one rationale offered for "one-way" fee
shifting statutes.223
The major disadvantage of fee shifting lies in its effect
upon the claims of individuals with moderate incomes.2 4
"Two-way" shifting provides both an incentive and disin-
centive to the plaintiff.2 2 5 The prospect of an undiluted
recovery serves as an incentive to the plaintiff,226 while the
risk of suffering a considerably larger loss provides a
strong disincentive.227 For example, a potential plaintiff
might be detered from filing suit against a large corporate
defendant, such as General Motors, if the plaintiff fears
paying the defendant's substantial legal fees. Although
there is no clear empirical evidence demonstrating which
of these two effects is stronger,228 fee shifting would
probably deter moderate income individuals from press-
ing their claims.2 2
E. Statutory Regulation
The regulation of percentage fees by statute or court
rule offers another possible alternative to contingent per-
2 See Rowe, supra note 81, at 149 n.47. "Two-way" shifting would allow the
plaintiff to press small strong claims since the plaintiff could recover his litigation
expenses from the defendant. Id. at 149.
221 Id. at 149 n.42. See also TEX. Bus & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(d) (Vernon
Supp. 1985).
224 Rowe, supra note 81, at 153. It is frequently asserted that fee shifting deters
individuals with reasonable, but not clearly meritorious, claims since a risk of sub-
stantial loss exists if the litigation is unsuccessful. Id.
225 Id.
2201 Id. The chief advantage of fee shifting is that it provides the plaintiff with an
undiluted recovery. Corboy, supra note 22, at 33-34.
227 Rowe, supra note 81, at 153.
228 See Pfenningstorf, supra note 210, at 76-77 (careful studies comparing the
effects Of the American Rule and European fee shifting have not been conducted).
22, Rowe, supra note 81, at 153. Two factors contribute to this effect. First,
moderate income individuals are generally risk averse. Second, fee shifting shifts
the risk of loss from the attorney (as is the case with contingent fees) to the client.
Id. See also Kritzer, supra note 13, at 133-38 (survey indicates that the effect of fee
shifting in Ontario is to discourage litigation).
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centage fees. 230  The twenty-five percent limitation im-
posed by the Federal Tort Claims Act23 ' provides and
example of a legislatively imposed fee restriction, while
the adjustable scale found in New Jersy Court Rule 1:27-
7(c) illustrates limitation of fees by court rule.232 Both ap-
proaches demonstrate attempts by bar associations, legis-
lative bodies, and the courts to prevent attorneys from
charging excessive fees. 23 3
Neither of these limitations offers an economically at-
tractive alternative to contingent percentage fees.23 4 Fee
ceilings do little to reduce the problems associated with
percentage fees.235 Additionally, a fee ceiling which sets
attorney's fees below market rates will have the effect of
discouraging attorneys from accepting certain cases. 36
An attorney is unlikely to accept a case unless his fee
.1.1 Schwartz & Mitchell, supra note 73, at 1144-45.
23 28 U.S.C. § 2678 (1982). Section 2678 provides:
No attorney shall charge, demand, receive, or collect for services
rendered, fees in excess of 25 per centum of any judgment rendered
pursuant to section 1346(b) of this title, or . . .in excess of 20 per
centum of any award, compromise, or settlement made pursuant to
section 2672 of this title.
Id. This statute places a ceiling on fees; courts are not required to award these
percentages. See, e.g., Schwartz v. United States, 381 F.2d 627, 630 (3d Cir. 1967).
242 NJ. CT. R. 1:21-7(c), reprinted in American Trial Lawyers Ass'n v. New Jersey
Supreme Court, 66 N.J. 258, 330 A.2d 350, 351 n.3 (1974). Rule 1:21 7(c) states:
In any matter where a client's claim for damages is based upon the
alleged tortious conduct of another, including products liability
claims, and the client is not a subrogee, an attorney shall not con-
tract for, charge, or collect a contingent fee in excess of the follow-
ing limits:
(1) 50% on the first $1000 recovered;
(2) 40% on the next $2000 recovered;
(3) 33 1/3 % on the next $47,000 recovered;
(4) 20% on the next $50,000 recovered;
(5) 10% on any amount recovered over $100,000.
N.J. CT. R. 1:21-7(c).
2'.1 Grady, supra note 96, at 25.
2.14 See Clermont & Currivan, supra note 2, at 593-94.
".1.1 Id. See supra notes 126-160 and accompanying text.
2,- Schwartz & Mitchell, supra note 73, at 1144. However, Schwartz and Mitch-
ell argue that if the lowered percentage exceeds the attorney's hourly rate, then
the attorney would still accept the case. Id. This argument ignores the risk pre-
mium component and the interest component contained in the unregulated con-
tingent percentage. See R. POSNER, supra note 60, at 448-49.
equals or exceeds his hourly rate plus a risk premimum
and the interest on the loan of the attorney's services.23 7
Thus, if a fee ceiling is set too low, it will be difficult for
some plaintiffs to secure representation. 3 8
An adjustable rate fee ceiling presents other problems.
These fee schedules provide the largest recovery for the
smallest claims. 39 While a large percentage may enable
the plaintiff to secure representation in a small case,240
these cases frequently do not require a great deal of atten-
tion from the attorney and a fifty percent share may be a
clearly excessive fee.24 '
Additionally, maximum fees interfere with the opera-
tion of the free market.242 If a one-third percentage fee is
excessive, other attorneys would lower their fees to attract
new clients.24 3 Economist Milton Friedman states: "mar-
ket competition, when it is permitted to work, protects the
consumer better than do the alternative governmental
mechanisms that have been increasingly superimposed on
the market. 21 4 4 Thus, fee regulations deprive the market
of its opportunity to work to protect the interests of both
consumers and attorneys.2 45
F. Legal Aid
Publicly financed legal aid has been proposed as an al-
ternative to contingent percentage fees.246 Under such a
legal aid system, the government would compensate the
attorney for the reasonable value of his services in repre-
2-17 See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
2-1 Schwartz & Mitchell, supra note 73, at 1144.
2-19 Corboy, supra note 22, at 36.
240 Clermont & Currivan, supra note 2, at 594.
241 See Grady, supra note 96, at 22.
242 By imposing a price ceiling, maximum fee schedules obstruct the normal
operation of the legal market. For a discussion of the effects of price ceilings on
the operation of markets see C. FERGUSON & S. MAURICE, supra note 86, at 314-18.
245 See supra notes 112-118 and accompanying text.
244 M. FRIEDMAN & R. FRIEDMAN, supra note 84, at 212.
245 Id. at 179-217. A free market has flaws, however it works better than gov-
ernment regulations since it allows individuals to take action to protect their
interests.
240 See, e.g., Minish, supra note 10, at 71-72.
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senting an indigent client.247 A legal aid system would al-
low indigent plaintiffs to obtain counsel to represent
them, thus allowing the plaintiffs to press their claims, and
satisfying one of the principle justifications for contingent
percentage fees. 48
The chief disadvantage of a publicly financed legal aid
system is that such a system would call for a substantial
expenditure by governments to provide a service which is
already available through the private market. 24 9 Addition-
ally, legal aid would have substantial administrative costs
because a screening agency would be required to prevent
frivolous lawsuits.25 ° Moreover, the independence of
members of the bar participating in the legal aid system
would be restricted because these attorneys would be-
come virtual employees of the government. 25 '
V. CONCLUSION
Although contingent percentage fees have a number of
problems,25 2 these problems can not be solved by imple-
menting artificial restrictions on the fees which attorneys
may charge. The best solution to the problems presented
by percentage fees would be to provide the public with as
much information as possible about the legal market.2 53
All restrictions upon the content of attorney advertising
241 See Youngwood, supra note 25, at 334. For example, under the English legal
aid system, the government pays ninety percent of the attorney's fees for office
consultations and litigation. Id. See supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text.
248 Youngwood, supra note 25, at 334.
24.. Cf Merritt v. Faulker, 697 F.2d 767, 769 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J. dissent-
ing, government should not be required to appoint an attorney to prosecute a
personal injury claim for a prisoner; if the prisoner's claim is meritorious, then
representation is available from the private market on a contingent fee basis).
' See Youngwood, supra note 25, at 334. In Great Britain a Legal Aid Commit-
tee examines the applicant's financial resources and the merits of the claim in
order to determine if the applicant is entitled to legal aid. Id.
1'. See Hughes, supra note 47, at 8 (legal aid has propelled the English Bar into a
virtual "handmaiden of the welfare state", with fees from assigned cases payable
from public funds).
', See supra notes 120-160 and accompanying text.
25. See supra notes 83-111 and accompanying text.
should be removed.254 Additionally, consumer groups
and bar associations should provide consumers with as
much information as possible about attorney fees and
quality. 55 If contingent percentage fees are excessive, at-
torneys will have an incentive to reduce their percentage,
especially if consumers have sufficient information to be-
come aware of these reductions.2 56 Thus, through im-
proved market information, percentage fees could be
reduced to the true market rate (if such fees are currently
excessive) .257
Of the proposed alternatives, the contingent hourly-
percentage fee 258 and attorney fee shifting 259 warrant the
greatest additional study. Despite the complicated calcula-
tions involved with the contingent hourly-percentage fee,
such a fee does offer such sufficient advantages 260 to sug-
gest that it should be tried, at least for court awarded fees.
Fee shifting warrants further study because it requires liti-
gants to account for the probability of success before
bringing litigation.2 6' Fee shifting would also discourage
frivolous lawsuits to a greater extent than contingent per-
centage fees.262
The use of hourly fees for plaintiff's personal injury
cases is not desireable because hourly fees may prevent
some plaintiff's from obtaining adequate representa-
tion.26 ' Additionally, the use of hourly fees does not cure
the economic conflict of interest between plaintiffs con-
2-14 Cf M. FRIEDMAN & R. FRIEDMAN, supra note 84, at 314-15 (even misleading
advertising is better than no advertising or government controlled advertising).
Additionally, attorneys would have an incentive not to engage in deceptive prac-
tices since this is not a sound way to develop a satisfied clientele. Id. at 212.
Moreover, an attorney could face a malpractice suit for engaging in deceptive
practice.
2 Schuck, supra note 96, at 569.
2" See supra notes 112-118 and accompanying text.
257 See supra note 115.
2. See supra notes 188-206 and accompanying text.
2"51 See supra notes 207-229 and accompanying text.
21WI See supra notes 192-204 and accompanying text.
211 See supra notes 218-229 and accompanying text.
2 2 See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
21. See supra notes 168-174 and accompanying text.
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tained in contingent percentage fees. 26 Statutory regula-
tion is undesirable because such price ceilings may be set
below market rates and thus diminish the supply of legal
services. 65 The primary disadvantage of legal aid is its
expense. Additionally, the services provided by a legal
aid system are currently provided by contingent percent-
age fees. 66
Of the proposed alternatives, fee shifting is the most
likely to be adopted in the United States. However, con-
siderable debate should be expected on the issue of
whether the fee shifting system should be "one-way ' 2 67 or
"two-way". 268 Most plaintiff's lawyers probably will pre-
fer "one-way" systems, while most defense lawyers would
favor "two-way" systems.
The contingent hourly percentage fee is unlikely to be
adopted due to its complicated formula. Many attorneys
and clients would be adverse to a fee system employing
such a complicated formula. Additionally, expanded legal
aid would probably not find great support in this era of
high budget deficits. Thus, the contingent percentage fee
will likely continue being the dominant means of financ-
ing personal injury litigation.
2-4 See supra notes 175-180 and accompanying text.
26-1 See supra notes 230-245 and accompanying text.
2 Cf See supra notes 246-25 1 and accompanying text.
267 See supra notes 212-213 and accompanying text.
2- See supra notes 214-217 and accompanying text.
